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A. Introduction: The Context of Non-Reference  
 
Jiri Zemanek, Professor at Charles University, Prague, asks what conclusions may be drawn from the current 
state of acceptance of the European Union (EU) law doctrine by the constitutional courts of the new Member 
States for their performance in the agenda of preliminary rulings. What can they learn from the experience of 
the old Member States? Should they follow the practice of the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional 
Court), which referred its first question in 1999, four years after its accession, and later repeated it several 
times? Or should they follow the most active Belgian Cour Constitutionnelle?
2
 Should Hungary follow the 
practice of the Italian Constitutional Court, Lithuania, France, Spain, or Germany? Having reviewed the case law 
of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the scholarly analysis in search of the “missing links”,
3
 this study 
wishes to contribute to the diverse range of ideas concerning European “rule of law” integration and  
constitutional court contributions to it. 
 
Hungary acceded to the EU in 2004.
4
 At the time of its accession, the goal was clearly to achieve perfect 
coherence between Hungarian law and EU law.
5
 As a starting point, the Parliament amended the Constitution 
and added a new Article 2/A.
6
 The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court that will be elaborated later on in 
this article was mostly based on this provision.  
 
Article 2/A. of the former Constitution stated that: 
 
By virtue of treaty, the Republic of Hungary, for the purposes of its 
participation as a Member State in the European Union, may exercise 
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3 See Part D – Constitutional Courts and the lack of preliminary reference. The missing link, in this Special Issue.  
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certain constitutional powers jointly with other Member States to the 
extent necessary in connection with the rights and obligations conferred by 
the treaties on the foundation of the European Union and the European 
Communities (hereinafter referred to as the “European Union”); these 





The new Fundamental Law, which has been in effect since 1 January 2012, states in Section E paragraph (1) 
that “Hungary shall contribute to the creation of European unity, in pursuit of the greatest freedom, well-being 
and security for the peoples of Europe.” Paragraph (2) adds that: 
 
[b]y virtue of treaty, Hungary, for the purposes of its participation as a 
Member State in the European Union, may exercise certain powers granted 
by the Fundamental Law jointly with other Member States, through the 
institutions of the European Union, to the extent necessary in connection 
with the rights and obligations conferred by the founding treaties.  
 
Paragraph (3) states that “[t]he law of the European Union may stipulate a generally binding rule of conduct 
subject to the conditions set out in paragraph (2).” And paragraph (4) of this Section stipulates that “[t]he 
authorisation to recognise the binding nature of an international agreement referred to in paragraph (2) shall 




Initiating a preliminary ruling procedure is a possibility, if not an obligation, for the courts of Member States 
that is aimed at developing the unified interpretation and enforcement of EU law. Judges are free to decide on 
whether an autonomous and uniform interpretation by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) is necessary to 
decide the case. Taking all preliminary references, it is rare that courts question the validity of a piece of 
legislation; most of the references, rather, ask for the interpretation of EU law.
9
 In Hungary, of the 77 
preliminary references up until 2013, only 15 were initiated by the Curia (the Supreme Court), more than 4/5 
were referred by lower courts (from the middle level of the judicial hierarchy), and no references were made 
by the Constitutional Court.
10
 But can the Hungarian Constitutional Court be considered at all a court of referral 
under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)? If yes, is it to be considered a 
court of last instance? Can the Hungarian Constitutional Court be in a situation in which the need to apply and 
thus interpret EU law emerges and becomes relevant for the purpose of deciding the case? If yes, what are 
these cases? 
 
In this article, I will describe how the Constitutional Court, by interpreting the Constitution and the 
Fundamental Law, has refrained from determining the specific consequences of EU accession for the 
relationship between the constitution and EU law. I explain that the Constitutional Court neither elaborated 
comprehensively its views on its proper role in achieving the constitutional aim of contribution to the European 
rule of law integration. I argue that there was, and there certainly will be case and controversy, when it 
becomes necessary for the Constitutional Court to take a stand on this matter of principle. When the occasions 
of decision occur, the institution of the preliminary reference may be of help for the Constitutional Court in 
finding a cooperative solution that is acceptable both for observing the Hungarian constitutional identity and 
promoting common constitutional goals as Member States of the Union.  
 
                                                 
7 See KENDE-SZŰCS (note 6), 769–775 on the interpretation of Article 2/A of the Constitution. 
 
8 See Decision 22/2012. (V. 11.) CC of 11 May 2012 in connection with this. The Constitutional court, conducting an abstract interpretation 
procedure, determined what treaties may fall within the scope of Section E of the Fundamental Law. 
 
9 Of the courts of the Member States joining the Union in 2004, only one reference from Malta in 2012 (C-221/09., AJD Tuna, 2011 E.C.R. I-
01655) claimed the invalidity of an EU regulation. In this case the CJEU could not identify any points where invalidity could occur. Réka 
Somssich, Előzetes döntéshozatali eljárások a számok tükrében – a  2004 óta csatlakozott országok bíróságai által kezdeményezett előzetes 
döntéshozatali eljárások 10 évvel a csatlakozás után, [The practice of referring cases in Member States joining the Union in 2004 in the last 
10 years], in A MAGYAR BÍRÓSÁGI GYAKORLAT AZ ELŐZETES DÖNTÉSHOZATALI ELJÁRÁSOK KEZDEMÉNYEZÉSÉNEK TÜKRÉBEN 31, 42 (András Osztovits ed. 2014). 
 




My aims are at once descriptive, analytical, and critical. With regard to Hungarian constitutional adjudication 
several claims are worth discussing. How should the Hungarian Constitutional Court act in case of a claim of 
unconstitutionality against a certain piece of EU law (1) or Hungarian law that is based on an EU secondary 
legislation (2)? Why does it not violate the Fundamental Law if a Hungarian piece of legislation is against EU law 
(3)? What if a new Treaty provision on the extension of EU competence raises the constitutional issue on the 
extent of sovereignty transfer (4)? As the editors have taken on the challenge of analyzing the role of the 
preliminary reference procedure in the caw law of constitutional courts, I will refrain from giving a general 
overview of all relevant Hungarian Constitutional Court cases on the relationship between Hungarian law and 
EU law.
11
 I will focus, rather, on how the preliminary reference procedure may or may not play a role in the 
aforementioned cases. 
 
B. The Constitution and the Fundamental Law as the Starting Point 
 
The oft-criticized EU clause (Article 2/A.) of the former Constitution
12
 textually did not much help the 
Constitutional Court in answering constitutional issues raised by petitions, because this clause focused on the 
criteria of accession rather than on the consequences of it. Although the Constitutional Court theoretically did 
not limit the scope of its examination under Article 2/A to issues with direct impact on the original transfer of 
sovereignty,
13




Article 6 paragraph (4) of the former Constitution declared that “[t]he Republic of Hungary shall contribute to 
the creation of European unity, in pursuit of the greatest freedom, well-being and security for the peoples of 
Europe.”  
 
The corresponding provisions of the new Fundamental Law are clearly intended to be of consolidating nature, 
as beyond some linguistic fine-tuning, only one new rule is added to the previous Constitution version: that EU 
law may set generally applicable rules of conduct. The fact that the EU may adopt such rules was already 
recognized, in any case, by ordinary court practice:  
 
Article 2/A paragraph (1) of the Constitution, by limiting the exclusive 
power of legislation, allows Community law adopted pursuant to the 
founding treaties of the European Union to grant rights to and impose 
obligations on persons under the sovereignty of a Member State without a 




The above-mentioned supplementary sentence of the Fundamental Law therefore expressed an already 
acknowledged characteristics of EU law at a constitutional level in domestic law. Although the Constitutional 
Court stated in its decision 22/2012 (V. 8.) CC that it regards the new Section E of the Fundamental Law as 
almost identical to the provision of the previous constitution, and thus the former case law remained relevant 
                                                 
11 For the latest analyses of all relevant decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court in English, see Flora Fazekas, EU law and Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, in EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN HUNGARY: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND THE LAW 32-73 (Márton Varju & Ernő Várnay eds., 2014). 
I will on many occasions use these short analyses in chapter B to highlight the essence of relevant jurisprudence. 
 
12 For a summary, see IMRE VÖRÖS, CSOPORTKÉP LAOKOONNAL: A MAGYAR JOG ÉS AZ ALKOTMÁNYBÍRÓSÁG VÍVÓDÁSA AZ EURÓPAI JOGGAL [Laocoon Group 
Photo: The Hungarian Law and Constitutional Adjudication in the Light of European Law] 95-111 (2012).  
 
13 Prior to the accession the Constitutional Court analyzed the possibility of limiting sovereignty in the following decisions: Decision 
36/1999 (XI.26.) AB of 26 November 1999; Decision 5/2011 (II. 28.) CC of 28 January 2011; Decision 1154/B/1995 AB of 13 February 2001; 
Decision 30/1998 (VI. 25.) AB of 25 June 1998. 
 
14 András Sajó, Learning Co-operative Constitutionalism the Hard Way: the Hungarian Constitutional Court Shying Away from EU 
Supremacy, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STAATS- UND EUROPAWISSENSCHAFTEN 351-370 (2004) and Renáta Uitz, EU Law and the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court: Lessons of the First Post-accession Encounter, in APRÈS ENLARGEMENT. LEGAL AND POLITICAL RESPONSES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 41-
63. (WojczekSadurski et al. eds. 2006) In a large number of countries whose relevant constitutional rules are similar, constitutional courts 
adopted decisions discussing these issues much more exhaustively, e.g. Germany, Italy, Spain, or the Czech Republic. A comparative 
analysis is given by FLÓRA FAZEKAS, A MAGYAR ALKOTMÁNYBÍRÓSÁG VISZONYA A KÖZÖSSÉGI JOG ELSŐBBSÉGÉHEZ EGYES TAGÁLLAMI ALKOTMÁNYBÍRÓSÁGI 
FELFOGÁSOK TÜKRÉBEN [The approach of the Hungarian Constitutional Court to the supremacy of Community law compared to the various 
approaches of other Member States’ constitutional courts] Doctoral dissertation 175-181 (2009) available at 
http://jog.unideb.hu/media/documents/doktori_nyilvanosvita/fazekas-ertekezes.pdf. 
 





, it is open to debate whether the Constitutional Court may still reinterpret in future jurisprudence 
its competences with regard to the application of EU law and harmonization issues referring to the new 
Fundamental Law. 
 
According to the official reasoning of Section E of the Fundamental Law, the EU has an independent legal 
system established by international treaties, and under EU law it is possible to define rights and obligations 
directly for persons and entities, and some rules are directly applicable in the territory of the Member States. 
As Hungary’s EU membership has a significant impact on the order and framework of the exercise of public 
power in Hungary, and as EU law very much determines the rights and obligations of Hungarian persons and 
legal entities, it is necessary for the Fundamental Law to provide a specific authorisation for exercising powers 
within the framework of the EU (under organizing principles affecting the entire Fundamental Law). This rule 
allows Hungary to exercise some of its powers through the institutions of the EU as a Member State. The 
relevant specific powers must be identified by an international treaty, but the extent of the exercise of powers 
through the institutions of the EU may not exceed the extent necessary with regard to the international treaty, 




C. The Constitutional Court as a Court of Referral 
 
Referring questions for a preliminary ruling cautiously might not have been in the center of scholarly debates 
prior to 2012, because it was not clear either from the regulation and the case law of the Constitutional Court 
or from the interpretation of the CJEU if the Hungarian Constitutional Court could at all, at that time, be 
considered a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.
18
 However, the Hungarian Fundamental 
Law has, in Article 24, significantly modified the competences of the Constitutional Court.
19
 I argue that having 
regard to its new competences, the Court qualifies as a court of referral under Article 267 TFEU.  
Among several changes, the new Fundamental Law introduced three types of constitutional complaint and 
abolished the former actio popularis. The lively system of actio popularis had entailed the possibility that 
anyone could turn to the Constitutional Court claiming that a law, legal provision, or a regulation was contrary 
to a constitutional provision. The petitioner could also request the annulment of that piece of law in this 
abstract ex post facto review procedure. A constitutional complaint under the former jurisdiction was to be 
lodged only in the case of a violation of rights caused by the application of an unconstitutional norm.  
 
The aims of the new constitutional complaint mechanisms with the introduction of the German type 
constitutional complaint is to review not only the constitutionality of a norm applied in a given court case but 
also to protect against all violations of rights caused by ordinary court decisions. Furthermore, the new 
complaint system claims to provide individual remedy against unconstitutional law in cases where no other 
judicial remedy is available. 
A new cardinal act governs the Constitutional Court.
20
 Under the new legislation, the primary competence of 
the Constitutional Court has shifted from the ex-post facto abstract review of laws to the adjudication of 
constitutional complaints, granting remedies in concrete cases when fundamental rights of individuals or legal 
entities are violated.
21
 Under the new regulation, petitioners can highlight whether, in a particular case, the 
application or non-application of EU law, or the incorrect interpretation of EU law, has caused the violation of 
their constitutional rights. They may further claim that the EU law applied in their case violates their 
constitutional rights. It is also possible to argue that a Hungarian piece of legislation founded on EU law (e.g., 
implementing a directive) violates their constitutional rights. The petitioner may claim that the CJEU is the 
court of last instance in her case therefore her right to effective remedy is violated by the decision of the non-
referring domestic court.  
                                                 
16 22/2012 (V. 8.) CC decision of the 8 May 2012 [42]-[46]. 
 
17 Translated by the author. 
 
18 FAZEKAS (note 14.), 75. 
 
19 For the elevated importance of the competence of constitutional courts to refer a case to the CJEU see MARTINICO (note 3), 4-6. 
 
20 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court. 
 
21 Available at www.mkab.hu/statisztika/2014. 
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As similar questions might be addressed to the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the new Fundamental Law 
has entered into force, the Court has definitely diminished chance to avoid situations where considering the 
referral is unavoidable. On the other side, taking into account the new competence of the Constitutional Court, 
the CJEU, following its case law, could hardly refuse the acknowledgment of the Constitutional Court as court 
of referral. 
 
D. The Basic Findings of the Constitutional Court Decisions Regarding its Task in EU related Constitutional 
Matters 
 
I. Implemented Secondary Legislation and the Role of the Constitutional Court 
 
Following the accession, Decision 17/2004 (V. 24.) CC
22
 was the first occasion when the Constitutional Court 
had the opportunity to elaborate on how and to what extent it is possible to review the constitutionality of a 
norm based on EU secondary legislation, namely on a directive. When regulating agricultural surplus stocks a 
contradiction arose between the Constitution and the Hungarian legislation implementing the EU Commission 
Regulation. The Constitutional Court conducted a standard ex post facto review of constitutionality and did not 
take into consideration that the Hungarian legislative measure was partly based on obligatory standards 
imposed by the Commission Regulation. The review procedure against the Act of 2004 on agricultural surplus 
stocks was initiated by the President of the Republic. The domestic act ordered that the owners of agricultural 
surplus stocks had to pay a certain fee if they had an impermissible quantity of products on the date of the 
accession. Because, due to several amendments, the exact content of the EU requirement was unclear up until 
a few months before Hungary’s accession, the lack of due time for preparation of the targeted owners was 
partly caused by the Commission Regulation itself.  
 
One of the claims of the President was that the Hungarian law had a retroactive effect that violated the 
principle of legal certainty. The Constitutional Court in this case, however, did not take into consideration the 
relevant Commission Regulation and skipped the problem of the relation between the two legal regimes and its 
role in handling conflicts. The Court noted that the relevant rules of EU law became mandatory with the date of 
the accession, but claimed that the petitioner required the examination of the Hungarian legislation. In the 
light of this observation, the Court conducted the standard review and declared several dispositions of the 
Hungarian regulation to be unconstitutional.  
 
This decision became a precedent for further cases in which the Hungarian legislation transposed EU law. This 
tendency in the practice of the Constitutional Court might be called the indirect constitutional review of 
Commission Regulations, as in cases of unconstitutionality the EU law in fact does not apply in Hungary.
23
 Had 
the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the Hungarian law to be judged was related to EU law, it should 
have considered supremacy and the relevant CJEU case law, as well as the question of whether it should turn 
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. This, however, would have led to applying special procedures and special 
assessments of what constitutionality as such is in a case of a piece of Hungarian legislation based on EU law. 
At the time of the decision, the Constitutional Court was certainly not prepared to bring a determined decision 





It was only in 2008, four years after the accession, that reflections on the role of the CJEU first appeared in the 
case law of the Constitutional Court.
25
 The first decision dealt with the division of competences between the 
                                                 
 
22 Decision 17/2004 (V. 24.) CC of 24 May 2004. 
 
23 FAZEKAS (note 11), 53. 
 
24 Id., 53. 
 
25 See the case law in more detail in Marton Varju & Flora Fazekas, The reception of European Union Law in Hungary: The constitutional 
court and the Hungarian Judiciary, 48 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1945-1984 (2011). A good counter-example for the standpoint of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court is of the Austrian Constitutional Court. The 2012 decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court is available in 
English at 
http://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfghsite/attachments/9/6/0/CH0006/CMS1353421369433/grundrechtecharta_eng
lish_u466-11.pdf. – need full citation of this case 
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Constitutional Court and the CJEU.
26
 The petitioner argued that the obligation that a referring Hungarian court 
has to notify the minister of justice as well when referring the question to the CJEU breached the Constitution’s 
Europe-clause, because it was inconsistent with ex Article 234 EC treaty (now Article 267 TFEU). The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court denied its competence to rule on the matter, and continued that “according to the rules of 
the Community, a decision on the compatibility of the domestic act under review with Community law falls 
within the competence of EU institutions and as the last instance the European Court of Justice”.
27
 The Court 
referred to the infringement procedure and the preliminary ruling procedure and acknowledged the 
competence of the European Commission and the CJEU, even in matters of possible conflict between the two 
legal orders, the non-conformity of Hungarian law with EU law. 
 
Controversially enough, the Constitutional Court mentioned in the same lines that EU law (i.e., ex Article 234 
EC Treaty and the relevant case law of the CJEU) leaves the definition of the relevant domestic procedural rules 
on preliminary references with the Member States, with the reservation that domestic rules cannot exclude 
the possibility of preliminary reference.
28
 After these considerations, the Court however surprisingly concluded 
within its own competence that the Hungarian procedural rules on preliminary references were not contrary to 




The application of the doctrine of acte claire was first raised in the case on the agricultural CAP Single Payment 
Scheme in a dissenting opinion. The procedure in 2010 was also initiated by the President of the Republic, who 
claimed that the Hungarian Act on Single Payment Scheme for Direct Support Payments under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) was unconstitutional. The President of the Republic claimed that the domestic act did 
not guarantee an adequate period of preparation. Agricultural land owners who had leased their land evidently 
could not take into consideration the new regulation on the support of certain agricultural activities and 
domestic lands.  
In its Decision 142/2010 (VII. 12.) CC
30
, just as in the case on agricultural surplus stocks, the Constitutional Court 
argued that the review may concentrate only on the domestic piece of legislation. This interpretation allowed 
the Constitutional Court to consider the petition of the President of the Republic on its merits. The Court 
applied again a standard review of constitutionality; it annulled the relevant provisions of the domestic act. The 
majority opinion of the Constitutional Court did not assess the constitutionality of the contested EU Regulation, 
openly did not interpret it, and therefore did not discuss the benefits of a preliminary ruling. The Constitutional 
Court furthermore did not reflect to the jurisprudence of other member states and the ECJ itself finding the 




The dissenting opinion, however, argued that the majority ruling implicitly engaged in the interpretation of the 
relevant EU Regulation. It held that it was unacceptable that the Court had failed to consider if it was necessary 
to ask for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the Regulation. Logically, as the dissenting 
opinion emphasized, the Constitutional Court is not capable to judge the margin of appreciation of the 
Hungarian legislator with regard to the interpretation and due implementation of the Regulation, if does not 
engage in the interpretation of the Regulation. The dissenting opinion argued that the Court implicitly indeed 
recognized the acte clair principle in this case, because otherwise it had been its duty to ask for the preliminary 




                                                 
 
26 Decision 61/B/2005 CC of 29 September 2008. For the critical analysis of the decision and other relevant decisions see MÁRTADEZSŐ & 
ATTILAVINCZE,  MAGYAR ALKOTMÁNYOSSÁG AZ EURÓPAI INTEGRÁCIÓBAN [Constitutionality in Hungary within the framework of European integration 
(2012)]. 
 
27 Repeated by the Decision 281/B/2007 CC of 6 April 2009 and Decision 770/B/2005 CC of 1 September 2009. 
 
28 The Court referred to Case C-166/73, Rheinmühlen, 197] E.C.R. 33. 
 
29 See the critical analyses of this case and of other relevant case law in detail in FAZEKAS (note 12) 32- 73. 
 
30 Decision 142/2010 (7.12.) CC of 12 July 2010. 
 
31 FAZEKAS (note 14), 75. 
32
 Dissenting opinion of Judge Laszló Kiss, I Chapter.  
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In 2008, the EUIN Agreement decision
33
  interpreted EU law without referring either to clear frameworks of 
interpretation and the position of EU law or to the task of the Constitutional Court related to EU law. The 
Agreement between the EU, Iceland, and Norway on extending the scope of application of the surrender 
procedure according to the European Arrest Warrant (the so-called EUIN Agreement) was brought before the 
Court by the President of the Republic. He claimed that the exemption made by the Agreement was 
incompatible with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (Article 57(4)). The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
stated that EU rules on the expedited preliminary ruling procedure guarantee that the court that is entitled to 
issue and receive a European Arrest Warrant obtains authentic interpretation of the European Arrest Warrant 
Framework Decision within a reasonable time from the CJEU. It follows from the words of the Constitutional 
Court that it is a constitutional obligation of ordinary courts that they turn to the CJEU if a dispute concerning 
the interpretation and application, and potentially the validity, of EU law is placed before them. Furthermore, 
they are bound by the interpretation of the CJEU.
34
 But what about the Constitutional Court itself? 
 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, when deciding the case, did not take into consideration the fact that the 
CJEU had declared the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision compatible with the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege. It emphasized, furthermore, that its decision did not affect the EUIN Agreement itself. 
However, as the EUIN Agreement is strictly linked to the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, the 
decision suggests that there are constitutional rules in domestic law that cannot be violated by the EU when 






 was about the 2004 Act on Firearms and Ammunition based on the 1991 EU Directive 
on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons. The Hungarian Constitutional Court examined the 
domestic act in an ex post facto review procedure and found that it was constitutional as it was proportionate 
with the aims of the domestic regulation. Although the Court again did not deal with the original EU Directive, 
it implicitly suggested that the aims and means of the EU regulation were in harmony with the protection 
provided by the Hungarian Constitution. 
 
In sum, in cases where the review of constitutionality aimed at examining the Hungarian implementing 
legislation, the Constitutional Court refrained from taking into consideration the influencing nature of EU 
legislation. In the course of the standard review of constitutionality, the Constitutional Court with more or less 
intensity noted the underlying EU legislation, but this did not determine the decision of the Court about the 
constitutionality of the examined Hungarian law.
37
 The Court did not consider asking for a preliminary ruling, 
because the sole discussion of the relevant EU secondary law did not influence the decision, meaning that 
there was no overwhelming need to have an autonomous interpretation of the original EU norm. However, this 
justification, as I will discuss in part C, is not quite convincing if we take into account the fact that the 
Constitutional Court in many cases should have separated the essential and mandatory content of EU law and 
other parts of the domestic legislation where domestic legislative organs had a margin of appreciation in 
implementation. 
 
II. The Constitutional review of EU Law (Especially Secondary Law with Direct Effect) and the Exclusion of the 
Role of the Constitutional Court 
 
Regarding the lack of competence to review the constitutionality of EU law, the Constitutional Court 
formulated its strong position quite early on. In the Lisbon decision 143/2010 (VII. 4.) AB, that will be analyzed 
in more detail below, the Court acknowledged that the Act on the Constitutional Court does not regulate its 
                                                 
 
33 Decision 32/2008 (III.12.) CC of 11 March 2008. 
 
34 See the analyses of the decision: Péter Kovács, A la recherche du bon chemin… - ou l’affaire du mandat d’arrêt européen devant la Cour 
constitutionnelle, in LA FRANCE, L’EUROPE ET LE MONDE, 363-379. (Jean-Denis Mouton ed., 2008). 
 
35 FAZEKAS (note 11), 56. 
 
36 Decision 744/B/2004CC of 1 February 2005. 
 
37 A late exception could be Decision 32/2012 (VII. 4.) CC of 4 July 2012 on the constitutionality of student contracts where the 




competences relative to EU law. As I will describe in part III, an exception is the a priori review of EU Founding 
Treaties and their amendments which can fall under review through the promulgating act. The Constitutional 
Court in line with the interpretation of the CJEU holds that the CJEU has exclusive competence to decide about 
secondary legislation. 
 
Interestingly, the Constitutional Court has never developed arguments concerning possible exceptions that 
may authorize the review in case of potentially ultra vires EU legislation or EU law possibly infringing certain 
fundamental constitutional provisions.
38
 The only reference to the constitutional boundaries of EU law is found 
in the Lisbon Decision. It holds that European integration cannot result in the breach of the principles of 
democracy, a state based on the rule of law, and popular democracy. 
 
The Constitutional Court never went further than this, although the transfer of competence (Section E 
paragraph 2) is to be interpreted as a domestic constitutional limitation on the law-making powers of the EU. 
Section E paragraph 3 of the Fundamental Law declares that EU law may stipulate generally binding rules of 
conduct that are subjected to the conditions set out in paragraph (2). The Constitutional Court has never 
claimed so far the competence to review if a secondary EU legislation violates Treaty provisions and is 
therefore contrary to Section E)of the Fundamental Law. In this case preliminary reference on invalidity would 
be unavoidable.  
 
III. Treaties and the Role of the Constitutional Court 
 
Decision 143/2010 (VII. 14.) CC
39
 offers the most comprehensive interpretation of the extent of the transfer of 
sovereignty and the role of the Constitutional Court in reviewing the constitutionality of the division of 
competence between Hungary and the EU. The petitioner requested the a posteriori examination of the 
unconstitutionality and also the annulment of the Act of Parliament implementing the Treaty of Lisbon. In the 
petitioner’s opinion, certain rules of the Treaty of Lisbon restricted Hungary’s sovereignty to an extent that, if 
their binding nature was recognized, the Republic of Hungary “would no longer qualify as an independent state 
governed under the rule of law.”  
 
The Constitutional Court conducted a substantive constitutionality review, the final conclusion of which was 
that the Act of Parliament promulgating the Treaty of Lisbon was not unconstitutional because the 
constitutions of Member States could still exercise control over the operation of the EU. The principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality would remain valid, and they ensure that the parliaments of Member States 
would still have the power to review draft legislation. Also, Member States would have the right to initiate an 
action for annulment, citizens could turn to the institutions of the EU through a Citizens’ Initiative, and the 




Undoubtedly, the Constitutional Court made efforts to establish a constitutionality standard, but similarly to 
Germany’s ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon, it could have discussed in much more detail whether the Hungarian 





The Constitutional Court declared that “if the Constitutional Court found an Act of Parliament implementing 
such a treaty (i.e. a treaty amending the founding and amending treaties of the European Union) 
unconstitutional, the decision of the Constitutional Court establishing unconstitutionality may not have an 
effect on the Republic of Hungary’s duties as a Member State of the European Union. The result of the 
Constitutional Court’s decision is that the legislator must create a situation in which the Republic of Hungary is 
able to fully comply with its duties under EU law without violating the Constitution“.  
                                                 
38 FAZEKAS (note 11), 59. 
 
39 143/2010 (VII. 14.) AB of 14 July 2010. 
 
40 Section IV.2.5 of the Decision. 
 
41 László Blutman, Reagálás az első szám vitaindítójára - A Magyar Lisszabon-határozat: Befejezetlen szimfónia Luxemburgi hangnemben 
[Reaction to the first issue’s article that sparked a debate – the Hungarian Lisbon ruling: Unfinished symphony with a Luxembourgish tone]. 





Although the Constitutional Court found that the final interpretation of the Founding Treaties and secondary 
legislation belonged to the competence of the CJEU, this did not prevent the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
from referring to certain provisions of the Lisbon Treaty connected to the case without providing or requiring 
their autonomous interpretation. In the Lisbon decision, this approach led to a rather superficial overview of 
the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions on withdrawal from the EU, on the subsidiarity control mechanism, on the 
European Citizens’ Initiative or on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court did not consider the duty to 
refer these contested questions to the CJEU for autonomous interpretation first
42
 before applying them as 




In Decision 22/2012 (V.8.) CC, the Constitutional Court held, in a procedure aimed at the abstract interpretation 
of Section E paragraph (2) and (4) of the Fundamental Law, that:  
 
the votes of two-thirds of the Members of the Parliament is required for 
the consent to be bound by an international treaty aimed at modifying or 
amending the rights and obligations originating from the founding treaties, 
provided that the treaty is aimed at jointly exercising further competences 
originating from the Fundamental Law. An international treaty can be, in 
particular, regarded as such, if Hungary is a party to it as the Member State 
of the European Union together with other Member States, and the treaty 
regulates subjects contained in the founding treaties, or it is aimed at 
implementing or supervising the founding treaties. The votes of two-thirds 
of the Members of the Parliament are not required for the consent to be 
bound by an international treaty, if the treaty would not result in exercising, 
jointly with the institutions of the European Union or with other member 




Although in this procedure related to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union the dilemma of asking for a preliminary ruling was not (and could not be) raised, the 
decision reinforces the former standpoint of the Constitutional Court, namely that it does not hold it necessary 
to engage in constrained interpretation, in interaction with the CJ-e-u in these matters. 
 
IV. Collision of EU law and Hungarian Law at Non-Constitutional Level and Consistent Interpretation - The Role 
of the Constitutional Court 
 
The final group of cases in my assessment concerns the review of the constitutionality of certain Hungarian acts 
that are claimed to be incompatible with EU law. The Constitutional Court declared that it does not have the 
competence to review whether Hungarian sub-constitutional legal acts are incompatible with EU law. Nor does 
the Constitutional Court check the adequacy of the transposition of EU secondary legislation. The 
Constitutional Court argues that Article 2/A of the Constitution and consequently Section E of the Fundamental 
Law does not require that the Hungarian legislation be in full conformity with EU law. This is why the 
Constitutional Court, in applying the constitution, cannot say that a Hungarian legal instrument that is 




                                                 
42 It is worth mentioning that no other constitutional court asked for preliminary ruling in the case of assessing the constitutionality of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
 
43 The English language press release on the Lisbon Decision contains a reference to the fact that the Court ‘used the theory of acte clair, 
but the decision itself did not contain this reference.  – need paragraph number of this. Available at 
http://alkotmanybirosag.hu/letoltesek/en_0143_2010.pdf. 
 
44 The official translation is found at the homepage of the Constitutional Court, available at 
http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0022_2012.pdf. 
 
45 Decision 66/2006 (XI. 28.) CC of 28 November 2006; Decision 87/2008 (VI. 16.) CC of 16 June 2008. Similarly, Decision 61/B/2005 of 29 
September 2008; Decision 770/B/2005 CC of 1 September 2009; Decision 29/2011 (IV.5.)CC of 5 April 2011; Decision 1053/E/2005 CC of 16 
June 2006; Decision 72/2006 (XII.16.) CC of 15 Dec. 2006. Cases collected by FAZEKAS (note 12), 64. 
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However, a concurring opinion attached to Decision 72/2006 (XII. 15.) CC claimed that the Court should have 
determined the constitutional requirements that must be enforced even in those cases where, as a general 
rule, the Constitutional Court does not have competence. The concurring judge suggested that when the 
violation of constitutional rights is at stake, the Court should review whether the legislator violated an 
obligation flowing from EU law. The non-compliance of Hungarian legislation with EU law in other cases cannot 
belong to the competence of the Constitutional Court, because the analyses of non-compliance in all cases 
necessitate the interpretation of EU law which falls within the competence of the CJEU. This argument, laid out 
in the concurring opinion, has never appeared in a majority decision of the Constitutional Court.  
 
The fact that the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence is strict about refusing this competence, relying on the 
textual interpretation of the constitution, leads to uncertainties in some court cases. These concern the 
applicable law and, in some cases, might harm parties when the EU law is more favorable for them, or when 




A decision of 2008 seemed to represent a slightly different stance regarding the possibility of transforming the 
question of non-conformity into a constitutional issue. The petitioner required the constitutional review of 
certain rules of the act on the preservation of nature. The provisions were based on the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Agreement (CITES) and an EU Regulation. 
The act regulated the keeping of birds taken from the wild and those born in captivity and used for falconry. 
The petitioners claimed that the uniform regulation of these activities breached the principle of equal 
treatment and the right to property.
47
 Although the first question to assess was the constitutionality of the 
implementing Hungarian legislation, after deciding that the act was in conformity with the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court examined the compatibility of the Hungarian provisions with EU law too. It declared the 
domestic measures to be in conformity with EU law. 
 
The conduct of the Constitutional Court here does not amount to a radical change in the jurisprudence, as it did 
not say that in case of non-conformity of the Hungarian act with EU law a breach of the Constitution could be 
established. Rather, the Court turned to EU law, to the 1979 Directive, to find the meaning of ‘falconry’ in the 
Hungarian act and then to decide about constitutionality. The Court in this case ruled on the constitutionality of 
a Hungarian norm, relying in its interpretation on EU law. However, the Constitutional Court did not have 
problems with the interpretation of EU law and thus did not consider turning to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling. 
 
Decision 32/2012 (VII. 3.) CC on the constitutionality of student contracts is also worthy of mention. The 
petitioner argued, among other claims, that the Hungarian legislation was incompatible with EU law. This 
argument was not rejected automatically by the Constitutional Court, on the basis that the Court does not deal 
with the pure contradiction of Hungarian law and the EU law. Rather, the Court referred to the obligation of 




In sum, whilst the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on this issue is quite strict on the surface, it is  not 
always consistent. The approach may change as well, because the composition of the Constitutional Court has 
changed significantly over the years.
49
 If the Constitutional Court engages in harmonious (consistent) 
interpretation, asking for preliminary rulings will be unavoidable in certain cases. It will become necessary to 
distinguish and identify the cases of acte clair and acte eclairé and to recognize the cases in which it is 
necessary to ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.  
 
C. In Search of the “Missing Link”  
                                                 
 
46 FAZEKAS (note 14), 65. 
 
47 Decision 485/E/2003 CC of 13 October 2008. 
 
48 FAZEKAS (note 11), 69. 
 
49 I refer not only to the significant change in the composition of the Court (every new member of the Court can be linked to the governing 
FIDESZ party due to the election procedure) but also to the fact that the number of the members of the Constitutional Court was increased 





I. Theoretical Considerations About the Possible Task of the Constitutional Court in Harmonising EU Law and 
Domestic Law While Protecting the National Constitution 
 
In the following part of the article, I will consider the critique presented in the Hungarian legal literature 
concerning the constitutional relationship of the two legal regimes and the task of the Constitutional Court in 
determining this without cooperating with the CJEU. Hungarian authors have often dealt, in particular, with the 
interpretation of the transfer of sovereignty. 
 
As indicated above, we know very little from the jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court about the 
assessment of the accession clause of the Constitution and the almost identical provision of the Fundamental 
Law, and thus about the extent of the transfer of competence and finally, in abstracto, about the task of the 
Constitutional Court regarding the clarification of the relationship between Hungarian law and EU law. 
According to Sadurski, an important foreign analyst of Hungarian legal practice, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, in a manner similar to the German Federal Constitutional Court, appears to be adopting a stand of 
protecting the primacy of the national Constitution.
50
 The paradox is that the Constitutional Courts of Member 
States have developed their position on this on the basis of an assumption that Member States are sovereign 
while the EU acquires  sovereignty for itself through its sui generis legal system.  
 
The accession clause in Hungary allows a separate body of law to enter Hungarian law. Although the so-called 
EU clause in the Fundamental Law allows the “joint exercising of powers”, which emphasizes the limits on the 
transfer of powers and, at the same time, stresses the normative nature of cooperation, the “influx” of EU law 
is controversial. Although S ection E of the Fundamental Law should grant precedence of application to EU law 





For the purposes of doctrinal clarity in Hungarian constitutional law, it would be useful to develop a core-
sovereignty test that defines the Fundamental Law’s inviolable essential content that is to be preserved from 
the legal effects of EU membership.
52
 This definition of counter-limits could set the ultimate boundaries of the 
transfer of sovereignty, and it would also define the relationship between the CJEU and Hungarian 
Constitutional Court on specific issues. It would also help in the context of deciding when to issue a preliminary 
reference. and when to decide solely at a domestic level. 
 
It is well known that in EU law, the division of powers between Member States and the EU is not regulated by a 
single rule but instead by countless rules scattered in the acquis determining what the EU institutions are 
authorized to do. The ultimate limits of this competence must, therefore, be fixed in domestic law through 
interpretation of national constitutions, no matter which national state organ is responsible for the task in 
question. The EU is authorized to take advantage of loopholes in the founding treaties,
 53
 but under EU law it 




According to this train of thought, a persistent conflict is that while the basic doctrine of the accession clause of 
the Fundamental Law states that the state will only yield power to the EU “to the extent necessary”, in 
connection with the rights and obligations conferred by the founding treaties, EU law states that it is up to the 
CJEU to determine what this ‘necessary extent’ means, because, to determine this, the objectives of EU law 
                                                 
50
 WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE 146 (2005).   
 
51 Imre Vörös, Európai jog-magyar jog: konkurencia vagy koegzisztencia? [EU law and Hungarian law: competition or coexistence?] 66 





 ANDRÁS JAKAB, A MAGYAR JOGRENDSZER SZERKEZETE [The structure of the Hungarian legal system] 236 (2007). 
 
54 The new challenge is the application of Art. 4(2) TFEU concerning the respect of the constitutional identity of Member States. See e.g. 
Giuseppe Martinico, What lies behind Article 4.2 TEU?, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 93-108 (Salz Arnaiz  & 
C.Alcoberro Livina ed., 2013) The development of this discourse will certainly have an effect related to the role of constitutional courts. 
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need to be interpreted.
55
 In sum, according to EU law, it could be necessary in certain cases to refer the 
question on the competence-competence issue to the CJEU; from the point of view of domestic law, however, 
it falls within the competence of the Member State to define the transfer of competence by the interpretation 
of the domestic constitution and without asking for a preliminary ruling.  
 
The obligation of acting jointly, however, might also mean that EU law may not separate itself from the law of 
Hungary; therefore, according to the principles of democratic legitimation and authorization, the ultimate 
source of the EU acquis is the Member State’s constitution. For these reasons, the Member State’s constitution 





Following this line of argument, one cannot claim that the Constitutional Court should have issued a question 
to the CJEU, or should have asked for autonomous interpretation such as in the above-mentioned case about 
the assessment of the Act on implementing the Lisbon Treaty. One can argue that the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court reserved for itself the right to decide on the meaning of the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the sovereignty transfer necessary to accept it. The Constitutional Court just 
reaffirmed the position of not interpreting EU Treaties solely with the interpretative tools and context 
developed in EU law, but using also its proper Hungarian constitutional assessment when it comes to deciding 
on the possible transfer of sovereignty by the Fundamental Law. This position, however, ignores the fact that 
EU Treaties, when accepted by the Member States, will be ultimately interpreted by the CJEU, and that 
secondary norms will be adopted within the framework of the Treaties as interpreted by the CJEU. 
 
Regarding the other main issue here, the review of constitutionality of Hungarian law based on EU law, many 
authors argue that the Hungarian Constitutional Court could examine whether the disputed Hungarian law 
actually transposes the content of an EU Directive (in this case, no constitutionality review would be possible) 
or includes rules when the Directive intentionally allows the legislator of the Member State to determine the 
regulation. In the latter case, actual review of constitutionality would be allowed, but in addition to tests of 
fundamental rights or other standard tests of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the interests of the EU and 
the objectives of the EU regulation would need to be taken into account.
57
 Following this opinion, in principle it 
would become possible for the Constitutional Court to find, for example, that the EU level of fundamental 
rights protection is insufficient, leading it to annul the implementing legislation. However, the method of 
review may not be the same in these cases concerning the constitutionality/fundamental rights test, because 
the obligation of cooperation imposed on Member States must be taken into account. This obligation may be 
fulfilled because of Section E of the Fundamental Law. Cooperation becomes possible either by adopting the 
French solution (which is that the Constitutional Court only offers remedies if the violation of a fundamental 
right is exceptionally serious), or by following the German approach (which is of only dealing with cases if it can 
be established that the protection of fundamental rights under EU law is reduced).
58
 Following this line of 
argument even further, there are cases in which it is necessary that the Constitutional Court refers the case to 
the CJEU and asks for the autonomous interpretation of the EU legislation, regarding its purposes, core 
content, and objectives.  
 
Others argue that even less than this could be supervised by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in the case of 
Hungarian norms based on EU law. For example, it could intervene only if rules on the limits of the transfer of 




In sum, the Hungarian legal scholarship is quite unanimous in accepting the case law of the Constitutional Court 
that EU secondary law as such cannot be examined by the Constitutional Court from the point of view of 
                                                 
55 JAKAB (note 53), 249. 
 
56 Pál Sonnevend, Alapvető jogaink a csatlakozás után. [Our fundamental rights after the accession] 7 FUNDAMENTUM, 27–37 (2003). 
57 Ernő Várnay, Az Alkotmánybíróság és az Európai Unió joga [The Constitutional Court and the Law of the European Union], 62 
JOGTUDOMÁNYI KÖZLÖNY 428, 432 (2007). 
 
58 Id., 432.   
 
59 Nóra Chronowski & Zoltán Nemessányi, Alkotmánybíróság-Európai Bíróság: felületi feszültség [Constitutional Court vs. the European 
Court of Justice: surface tension],4 EURÓPAI JOG 19, 27 (2004). 
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domestic constitutionality, meaning that the question of preliminary references does not arise in these cases 
(1). However, when it comes to Treaties (2), or even the review of Hungarian law implementing EU law (3), 
many authors claim that it would be necessary for the Constitutional Court to identify EU law elements and EU 
law influence and to refer the question to the CJEU if necessary to discover the autonomous interpretation. 
Coherent interpretation would also be necessary in order to protect the aims and duties formulated in Section 
E of the Fundamental Law, and this would not be possible without cooperating with the EU and asking for a 
preliminary ruling when necessary (4). The context of non-reference is defined by uncertainty, and the missing 
link here could be a clear doctrine similar to the doctrines developed by some other Member States. 
 
II. The Reality: The Application of Preliminary Reference by Ordinary Courts 
 
What must have become clear for ordinary courts on the basis of the relevant decisions of the Constitutional 
Court is that a Hungarian law violating EU law is not to be considered unconstitutional automatically. The task 
of resolving any conflict between a Hungarian piece of legislation and EU law will still be reserved for ordinary 
courts. The task of ensuring uniformity was carried out by the Supreme Court after accession. 
 
Closely connected to constitutional rights or principles, Hungarian courts mostly refer cases to the CJEU in 
matters of administrative law, though the subject-matters are very divergent. Courts have even also asked for 
the interpretation of provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, although without any success.
60
 When 
compared with the other Member States which joined the EU in 2004, the Hungarian courts have been quite 




In Hungary, ordinary courts are responsible for the efficient enforcement of claims made under EU law, the ex 
officio application of EU law if necessary, the interpretation of national law in conformity with EU law, 
disregarding national law if it violates law, and requests for preliminary rulings from the CJEU if necessary or 
obligatory. These duties derive from the “loyalty clause” in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and the CJEU’s related case law, the requirement of uniform and efficient application, and the primacy of EU 
law.
62
 Ordinary courts apply the acquis more or less in line with the set of requirements imposed by the CJEU, 
which is practically why it is possible that the task of the Constitutional Court is less emphasized in Hungary’s 
everyday legal practice. 
 
D. Competition or Cooperation? – A Necessarily Ad Interim Conclusion 
 
In contrast with international law, which is treated uniquely in Hungary, the legislator has not developed 
special procedures or methods for assessing the constitutionality of Hungarian laws based on EU law or EU law 
applicable in Hungary. As Section E of the Fundamental Law acknowledges, EU law may set generally applicable 
rules of conduct in Hungary. Irrespective of whether they are implemented in Hungarian law, they form part of 
the rules of conduct. 
 
I argued that it is problematic how the Hungarian Constitutional Court differentiates between implemented 
and non-implemented EU secondary law with regard to the possibility of constitutionality review. As I 
demonstrated above, the Constitutional Court has, so far, taken quite strongly the position that it does not 
have the competence to review the constitutionality of EU norms themselves, not even when they are directly 
applicable in Hungary. However, it struck down Hungarian legislation that was based on EU law without 
examining whether the Hungarian legislator had any discretion in deciding on the content of the exact 
provisions or whether it was strictly bound by EU law.  
 
                                                 
 
60 Most cases are connected with the effectiveness of the decision-making process and fair procedure and fair treatment from the officer’s 
side. Zsófia Varga, Az alapjogi Charta a magyar bíróságok előtt. [the Charter of Fundamental Rights before the Hungarian Courts] 68 
JOGTUDOMÁNYI KÖZLÖNY 553-562 (2013) 
 
61 SOMSSICH (note 9), 31. 
 
62 FAZEKAS (note 14), 349. 
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The Constitutional Court, following its previous case law, carries out a standard substantive constitutionality 
review in cases of petitions aimed at the constitutionality review of Hungarian laws based directly or indirectly 
on EU law. This might result in an open confrontation of domestic law, domestic institutions, and EU law and 
EU institutions. (This would also be the case if the Constitutional Court claimed that it had competence to 
review compulsory rules of conduct imposed by EU legislation directly if they violate the essential principles of 
the Fundamental Law, the constitutional identity, and established the unconstitutionality of a directly 
applicable legal instrument.)  
 
I argued that even in the case of acceptable theoretical foundations for such positions in domestic law, without 
cooperating with the CJEU on matters affecting the application of EU law, the conduct of the national 
constitutional court might produce different sets of applicable rules or interpretations in Hungary than in other 
Member States. This obviously violates several EU principles. Why not instead seek cooperative solutions that 
are acceptable for both the EU and the national constitutional court? The institution of preliminary reference 
could also be very useful for the sake of preserving national constitutional identify by convincing the CJEU to 
favor one interpretation to the other. Dialogue in case of conflict might develop solutions favorable for both 
the Member State and for its Union. 
 
The theoretical possibility that the Hungarian Constitutional Court engages in a dialogue with the CJEU in the 
near future is not excluded. Having regard to the fact that the text and the context of the new Fundamental 
Law in Hungary are similar but not identical to the former Constitution regarding the integration clause (Article 
E) and other relevant provisions, it is possible that in the event of a competent petition, the Constitutional 
Court would reconsider the position it developed in Decision 22/2012 (V. 8.) AB and reflect on some basic 
questions of interpretation.  
 
In borderline cases, the preliminary reference procedure gives the opportunity to the CJEU to decide on the 
interpretation and scope of EU law. In case the CJEU determines which parts of the norm under 
constitutionality review must be bound strictly by the secondary legislation as interpreted by the CJEU, and 
what the issues are where the Member States have discretionary powers, the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
becomes competent to decide on how to rule on the constitutionality of the different provisions of the 
examined piece of law. 
 
I argued that the Hungarian Constitutional Court, with its new competences and constitutional complaint 
mechanisms, definitely qualifies as a court of reference under Article 267 TFEU. Two sui generis legal regimes, 
EU law and the law of a Member State, will have to resolve legal disputes in a coordinated manner, with 
respect for each other and with regard to common goals and values. 
